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Kollakowski: “Great Regional Engagement” Rather than “Great Sea Power”—Russia’

“GREAT REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT”
R ATHER THAN “GREAT SEA POWER”
Russia’s New Supply Point on the Red Sea Coast
Tobias Kollakowski

F

ollowing a Russo-Sudanese agreement on military cooperation that came into
effect in May 2019, a series of legal documents were ratified in November–
December 2020 that give the Russian military access to the Sudanese harbor
of Port Sudan.1 The basing agreement permits the establishment of a punkt
material′no-tekhnicheskogo obespecheni͡ia (logistical supply point) and subsequently the development of infrastructure necessary for the maintenance of ships
and the recreation of ships’ crews.2 Sudan retains equal rights to use the berthing
frontage—if Russian authorities agree. The supply base territory includes the
nearby coastal and water zone. At the tactical level, the Russian chief of the supply
base and the Sudanese commander of the Port Sudan naval base are authorized
by their respective ministries of defense to address questions related to use of
the facility. While Sudanese security forces carry out landward protection of the
base, the Russian armed forces are responsible for its seaside protection and the
provision of air defense. In addition, the Russo-Sudanese contract allows Russia
to carry out all kinds of activities considered necessary for the operation of its
warships, including dredging and setting up floating berths. Russia is allowed
to modify, reconstruct, and demolish real estate it has leased, if the Sudanese
side agrees.3 Sudan retains the option to request Russian assistance on a range of
tasks, including search and rescue, defense against
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swimmer incursions, air defense, and deliveries
Navy Reserve, is a PhD student at King’s College
4
London’s War Studies Department and a research of arms to the respective parties. The term of the
fellow at the German Institute for Defence and Straagreement is twenty-five years, with automatic
tegic Studies.
renewal every decade thereafter if neither country
objects.5
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The agreement immediately gained the attention of the news media, whose
primary interest lay in the intentions behind the Russian plans.6 Russia’s new
military base on the Red Sea, although arguably representing the logical climax
of recent Russian naval involvement on the shores of East Africa and the western
Indian Ocean, is merely one manifestation of Russia’s resurgent interest in the
region since the beginning of the twenty-first century. As extensively covered by
both journalistic and academic writing over the past two decades, examples of
Russia’s (naval) engagement policy in the region have included port visits to Russian partners and regional powers, the participation by the Russian Federation
Navy (RFN) in counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa, exploration of
marine-energy resources, Russo-Indian military and defense-industrial cooperation, arms exportations, and exportations of nonmilitary nuclear technology to
Indian Ocean littoral states.7
Some media outlets portrayed the Kremlin as being on the road to taking
control over the sea routes accessing significant portions of Africa and the Persian Gulf.8 In contrast, this article argues that the Russian naval presence in the
western Indian Ocean and its adjacent marginal seas and the acquisition of a
naval base on the shores of the Red Sea do not reflect an oceanic ambition aimed
at attaining ultimate status as a “power in the sea” in this region of the world. It
also seeks to show that twenty-first-century Russian naval activities in the Indian
Ocean are not a revival of those of the Soviet naval force that formerly operated in
the region—the Soviet Pacific Fleet’s famous 8th Operational Squadron—as there
are significant differences in the natures of the two naval task forces.
First, a quick look at the 8th Squadron will reveal the dimensions and operational capabilities of the once-mighty Soviet naval presence in the region. Next,
a short examination of Russian naval activities in the same region today suggests
that this current naval manifestation does not represent a reestablishment of
the Soviet naval presence, because, although the current force may function as a
“sharp” policy instrument, it does not possess the military capabilities necessary
to achieve relevant operational objectives in a high-intensity conflict. Rather
than blue-water operational objectives, Russia’s military presence at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century in the western Indian Ocean
area serves wider political goals, as underlined in the succeeding section of the
article. These political objectives are manifold, concern government and nongovernment actors at the northern and western shores of this great basin, and are
essentially terrestrial in character.
In the end, this article argues that the primary motivation driving Russia’s
naval engagement in this region is not oceanic but land-centric and littoral, as
Russia seeks to gain access to the African continent and to maintain close relations with various partners in the region.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/7
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THE SOVIET 8TH SQUADRON DURING THE SECOND HALF OF
THE COLD WAR
In 1968, for the first time, the Soviets publicly announced the deployment of a task
force to the Indian Ocean. It had been detached from the Pacific Fleet and consisted of a Sverdlov-class cruiser, two guided-missile destroyers, and a submarine.9
As Mark Carolla points out, the Soviet naval presence initially was quite limited; it
operated a daily average of three ships in the Indian Ocean, lacked regional naval
bases, and suffered from the closure of the Suez Canal as a consequence of the
1967 Arab-Israeli War.10 Over the next decade, however, the Soviet Union (USSR)
significantly strengthened its foothold in the region by securing access to various
ports throughout the Indo-Pacific and establishing a standing naval formation.11
This forward-deployed task force of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was called the
͡
8-ia operativna͡ia ėskadra (8th Operational Squadron).12 At different points in
time, its principal bases in the region included Basra, Iraq; Berbera, Somalia;
Nakura (or Nokra), Ethiopia (at the time, now Eritrea); and Aden, South Yemen
(as the country commonly was called at the time, prior to its 1990 unification
with North Yemen, now Yemen).13 Typically between eight and twenty-five
units were allocated to the 8th Squadron, usually consisting of seven or eight
surface combatants, one or two submarines, one or two intelligence ships, and
up to a dozen auxiliary vessels.14 During certain periods, amphibious units
were present as well.15 In March 1978, the strength of the Indian Ocean squadron reached a historic high when there were thirty-two Soviet warships and
auxiliary vessels present in the region. Thus, during most of the second half of
the Cold War, the force level of the 8th Squadron ensured that the Soviet navy
outnumbered its U.S. counterpart in the region during peacetime, although the
United States could deploy overwhelming naval forces to the region quickly
during times of crisis.16 The squadron’s primary area of operations (AO) was
the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, although its warships frequently
operated in adjacent seas. In addition, the 8th Squadron received aerialreconnaissance support from Soviet aircraft that could deploy from airfields at
Uanle Uen, Somalia; Asmara, Ethiopia (now Eritrea); and South Yemen when
operating in the Indian Ocean and Iraq when in the Persian Gulf.17
On a policy level, this naval presence in the Indian Ocean area was just one
component—albeit a significant one—of a regional-engagement policy encompassing various elements; in addition to arms exports to littoral countries, they
included economic- and diplomatic-policy tools.18 This engagement was part of a
wider competition for regional influence vis-à-vis its superpower rival, the United States of America; the declining former colonial power, the United Kingdom;
and its main competitor in the Communist camp, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).19 Arguably, the Soviet task force’s most notable wartime mission occurred
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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during the course of the 1977–78 Ogaden war, when Soviet merchant and naval
vessels carried large amounts of war matériel and supplies to Ethiopian ports.20
Given the remarkable size and composition of this Soviet naval formation, its
access to local military bases, and the geostrategic importance of its AO, the 8th
Squadron also could have been used to achieve military objectives if the Cold
War had turned hot. Soviet adversaries in the first world (NATO) and the third
world (the PRC) assessed that in a high-intensity-conflict scenario the standing
Soviet naval task force would be a major threat to the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connected the global West with the oil-supplying countries of
the Middle East, with the capability to interdict shipping routes by choke-point
control (see figure 1).21
Furthermore, as T. B. Millar argues, the Indian Ocean also was of great strategic significance to the USSR itself, as it connected the Soviet Far East with the
European parts of the Soviet empire without relying on the fragile land-based
communications that a hostile China might impair during conflicts.22 This argument was even stronger at the time because global warming had not yet made the
Northern Sea Route as navigable as it is today. Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till also
stress the importance of the USSR’s naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf and the
Arabian Sea against the background of postrevolutionary Iranian policy actions,
including the fact that even Soviet merchant shipping came under attack during
the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War.23
Thus, because of the Soviet navy’s substantial capabilities in the Indian Ocean
and its adjacent marginal seas during the second half of the Cold War, the service
could exercise the full range of military operations other than war and serve as
a powerful political instrument during times of peace. During times of conflict,
the Soviet squadron could undertake regional sea-denial operations when confronted with a superior adversary (e.g., NATO) or contribute regionally to secure
Soviet interests and global sea-lanes when in conflict with an adversary fielding
an inferior naval force.
Certainly, the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean also was motivated by many
other, nonpurely naval considerations, such as the USSR’s space program, with
its sea-based tracking-and-recovery components.24 However, as these matters are
not central to the argument presented in this article, they will not be discussed
further.
THE RUSSIAN NAVAL PRESENCE
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION TODAY
The establishment of a Russian supply base on the Red Sea has been discussed
publicly since at least 2017. This move needs to be interpreted within the contexts equally of current Russian policy interests and Russian naval activities in
the region.25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/7
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FIGURE 1
SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE COLD WAR
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The Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the third
decade of the twenty-first century contrasts with the previous presence of the
Soviet 8th Squadron. In particular, the current incarnation is not permanent and
leaves a wide spectrum of naval capabilities uncovered.
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Since the autumn of 2013, Russia has not maintained a standing naval presence in the Horn of Africa area. As a representative of the European Union (EU)
Naval Force Somalia points out, for the past ten years “Russian warships have
only sporadically conducted counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia
and normally only when in transit through the Gulf of Aden.”26
Nevertheless, while their presence has not been permanent, Russian warships
are regular visitors to the Indian Ocean and its neighboring seas. For example, in
October 2018 the Udaloy I–class destroyer Severomorsk deployed to the Indian
Ocean area to support maritime-security operations in the pirate-infested waters
for more than two months.27 Again, in November 2019, a task group consisting
of the Neustrashimy-class frigate Yaroslav Mudry, the tanker Yelnya, and the
seagoing tug Viktor Konetsky passed through the Suez Canal, crossed the Gulf
of Aden, and participated in the Russo-Indian naval exercise INDRA-2019 off
the coast of Goa from 10 to 19 December 2019.28 Russian naval relations with
India and the annual holding of the INDRA exercises have remained a keystone
of Russia’s policy toward the region since 2014, even when Russia began to expand its regional engagement by making port calls in Pakistan and otherwise
strengthening its relations with Islamabad.29 The same task group, centered on
Yaroslav Mudry, then proceeded to Iran to join the trilateral Russo-Sino-Iranian
maneuver that took place in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean from 27
to 30 December 2019.30 Afterward, the task group held a joint antipiracy drill
with the Japanese destroyer Harusame in the northern Arabian Sea and stayed
in the AO until March 2020 to aid with the international fight against piracy in
the region.31 Subsequently, Yaroslav Mudry escorted Gazprom’s pipe-layer ship
Akademik Cherskiy, sent to complete the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to the Baltic Sea. Both ships arrived in the Baltic in May 2020.32 In the same
month, the Russian Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Grigorovich, accompanied
by the rescue tug Professor Nikolai Muru, entered the Indian Ocean, visited the
port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, and returned to the Mediterranean in June 2020.33
Moreover, in January 2020, the U.S. Fifth Fleet reported a near collision between
the destroyer USS Farragut (DDG 99) and a Russian intelligence vessel in the
northern Arabian Sea.34
Although open-access information about naval-intelligence activities is very
rare, signals-intelligence vessels generally tend to conduct reconnaissance/
collection operations against a particular set of targets over a long period or on a
frequent basis, to generate the necessary basic data. Therefore, it is safe to assume
that the waters of the western Indian Ocean’s marginal seas are a primary AO for
Russian naval intelligence. The high concentration of naval vessels and military
installations in the conflict-ridden Persian Gulf and in the Horn of Africa area
offers an abundance of high-value reconnaissance targets.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/7
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On the basis of the modus operandi of the RFN in the Indian Ocean area over
the past years, several assessments can be made.
First, Russian task groups deployed to the region generally consist of one
surface combatant, a replenishment vessel, and a seagoing tug. In fact, this has
been the standard composition of Russian task groups operating in this part of
the world for about a decade.35 Given that they feature only one warship, these
deployments offer much less than the complete spectrum of naval capabilities
that a combatant would require in a high-intensity conflict. Additionally, in such
a scenario, the slow-moving sea tugs—whose hydroacoustics must be decades
behind those of modern warship designs—would impair severely the operational
capabilities of these task forces. Ultimately, without sea-based airpower and no
regional Russian air bases from which to deploy fighter, strike, and maritimepatrol aircraft, Russian ships in this part of the world operate with a complete lack
of air support. Therefore, Russian naval deployments in the Indian Ocean area
are not suited to conduct wartime military operations.
The noncombat operational focus of these deployments also is reflected in the
current Russian maritime doctrine, published in 2015. For the Indian Ocean area,
the Kremlin’s strategy paper defines “the development of friendly relations with
India” as “the most important focus of the national maritime policy in the Indian
Ocean regional direction,” and further states that the “National Maritime Policy
is also aimed at building up positive cooperation with other states in the region.”36
While the Russian naval task forces in the Indian Ocean area continue to fulfill
diplomatic and reconnaissance functions by conducting multinational exercises,
calling in ports, and gathering intelligence, the differences in force size, endurance, and capabilities make it very problematic to draw any similarities between
the current Russian naval presence and the historical Soviet 8th Squadron.37 Already in 2011, Alexey Muraviev, a specialist on the Russian Pacific Fleet, pointed
out that “[c]ontrary to Soviet times, Russia’s engagement in the IOR [Indian
Ocean region] is neither driven by any grand national agenda, nor by geostrategic
challenges that require a considerable immediate response.”38
In contrast to the claims outlined in the introduction, Russia’s decision to lease
a military base on the Red Sea should not be interpreted as a sign of Russian sea
power returning to the Indian Ocean. Rather, it is driven by motivations that are
born out of the RFN’s transition into a green-water navy.39
In 2011, in light of the closing of Russia’s support facility in Cam Ranh Bay,
Vietnam, and increasing operational demands on the RFN in the Mediterranean
and Indian Ocean theaters owing to considerable Russian antipiracy efforts at the
turn of the decade, academic Muraviev elaborated on Russian needs to expand
overseas basing capabilities, especially in Tartus, Syria, and plans to enhance the
RFN’s oceangoing potential and overseas power-projection capabilities within
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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the next ten years.40 While the first forecast did become reality within the last
decade, the second took a course opposite to that predicted.
A quick look at the Russian naval force posture reveals the impact of Russian
naval arms procurement throughout the last decade. Drawing on information
published in Jane’s Fighting Ships, figure 2 shows the makeup of the three Russian
naval formations whose ships are most likely to replenish at Russia’s new naval
base at Port Sudan: the Pacific Fleet, whose ships historically were tasked to form
the 8th Squadron; the Baltic Fleet, whose warships also have deployed to conduct
antipiracy operations in the Indian Ocean; and the Black Sea Fleet, whose AO
encompasses the greater Mediterranean region.41 Warships from the Mediterranean easily could be tasked to redeploy to the Indian Ocean, as was the case with
Admiral Grigorovich in 2020.
Already a decade ago, when the RFN still operated a standing antipiracy formation in the Horn of Africa AO, the Russian naval posture included only a limited number of major surface warships that were capable of overseas, blue-water
operations.42 All these vessels were legacy (former Soviet) units. The Udaloy-class
destroyers, which displace more than 8,600 tons full load and feature great sea endurance, frequently provided the surface combatants for Russian antipiracy task
forces at the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century, as they formed
the backbone of the Russian fleet.43
However, even though Russian naval procurement at the beginning of the
current century has provided the RFN with minor surface vessels in sufficient
numbers—sufficient not merely to replace existing vessels but to enhance the
Russian naval force posture—Russian shipyards effectively could not provide the
FIGURE 2
DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN NAVAL FORCES 2009–20
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navy with major surface units except by modernizing older Soviet vessels. These
acquisitions and changes in Russia’s naval order of battle are in line with a current fleet design that emphasizes surface vessels that are small but heavily armed,
with great offensive capabilities that rely on advanced missile systems, such as
those of the Kalibr family.44 Discussing the reasons behind this trend, including
strategic considerations and industrial limitations, is beyond the scope of this
article; nevertheless, it has had a strong impact. As shown in figure 2, the number
of blue-water vessels within the RFN has decreased significantly.
Looking beyond pure numbers to the size and condition of some of these ships
further reinforces the argument. Jane’s Fighting Ships classifies Steregushchiy-class
warships—the most numerous of Russia’s newest medium-size surface-warship
designs—as frigates. However, with a full-load displacement of just 2,235 tons,
these vessels—whose primary intended AO is the littoral—rank at the very low
end of frigate dimensions.45 A comparison with their European counterparts,
such as the British Duke class (4,267 tons full load), the German Brandenburg
class (5,487 tons full load), or the French Aquitaine class (6,096 tons full load),
reveals the striking differences in displacement.46 Indeed, many English and Russian sources consider the Steregushchiy-class vessels to be corvettes.47
Furthermore, there is the question of seaworthiness. According to Jane’s, as of
2020 the Sovremenny-class destroyer Nastoychivy was the last destroyer reported
to be in service with the Russian Baltic Fleet.48 Serious doubts exist, however,
regarding the material condition of this 1980s-design ship, which has been in
overhaul for years, and whether it ever will return to active duty.49
Without new capital ships on the production lines at Russian shipyards, the
RFN’s aged cruiser and destroyer forces soon are going to face retirements without replacements. Thus, as Russia seeks to continue maintaining a naval presence in the Indian Ocean region, the RFN very likely will have to deploy its new
generations of smaller warships. While the armament of these corvettes and light
frigates might be just as formidable as that of their Soviet predecessors (or even
more so), sea endurance very likely will turn out to be a crucial factor in enabling
or limiting long-range deployments. A 2016 deployment executed by warships of
the RFN Pacific Fleet’s Kamchatka Flotilla demonstrated the Russian naval leadership’s determination to commit minor surface combatants, such as corvettes
and minehunters, to long-range, out-of-area deployments.50 Given this issue of
sea endurance, the RFN benefits greatly from access to a network of supply points
stretching from the Black Sea to the Red Sea (see figure 3).
Nevertheless, the potential value of Russia’s new supply base in Sudan for
operational purposes in the wider region should not be overrated. As mentioned above, given the very limited capabilities of Russian task groups operating periodically in the region, Russian naval deployments to this AO should be
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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FIGURE 3
RUSSIAN NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS ALONG THE SOUTHERN MARITIME FLANK,
AROUND 2020
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interpreted not primarily in operational terms—for instance, as efforts to assert
sea control and sea denial—but rather as political instruments. The characteristics of Russia’s new naval base support a similar interpretation.
According to the current conditions of the bilateral agreement between the
Russian Federation and the Republic of the Sudan, Russia may not station more
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/7
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than three hundred military and civilian personnel at the base, supporting no
more than four units, at any one time.51 Consequently, the new Russian base
at Port Sudan would not be able to support large task forces. As Yuri Lyamin, a
Russian specialist on the Middle East, points out, Russia’s supply point in Port
Sudan very likely will assume a function similar to that which Tartus did before
it received its massive upgrade during the Syrian civil war: as a supply base offering limited infrastructure, merely enabling “our ships to replenish stocks and, if
necessary, carry out minor maintenance.”52
The current berthing limit of four ships also needs to be put in perspective.
As already pointed out, the Russian naval task groups that deploy frequently to
the region generally are composed of one warship, one supply vessel, and one
seagoing tug. Given that even Admiral Grigorovich, one of Russia’s newest warships, has to be accompanied by a tug when operating in the Indian Ocean, and
the fact that the average displacement of the ships within Russian warship classes
has decreased, which increases ships’ need for replenishment when operating
far from home ports, it is safe to assume that the makeup of Russian task groups
in the future also will include a tug and a logistics/supply vessel. This makes it
likely that no more than two Russian warships will berth at the supply base at
any time. With a current limitation of three hundred Russian personnel (including maintenance personnel) at Port Sudan, Russia’s model of potent antiaccess/
area-denial zones—a dominant feature of academic and military debates about
Russian capabilities in the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black Seas—is unlikely to
be applicable or applied to the Red Sea.53
In light of the absence of primary operational objectives, more explanation is
needed to account for Russia’s establishment of its new logistics/supply base in
Sudan. It is worth noting that while Russia practices naval diplomacy to pursue
political objectives in this region, it does so in other parts of the world as well—
for instance, in the Caribbean Sea and Southeast Asia—yet so far no publicly
available information has revealed that the Russian military has opened any new
naval bases or reopened former Soviet bases in those regions.
RUSSIA’S INTERESTS IN SUDAN AND NORTHEAST AFRICA
Since the strategic importance for Russia of the Indian Ocean by itself hardly
seems sufficient to justify the establishment of a military presence on the shores
of the Red Sea, with all the responsibilities that accompany a long-term commitment, understanding the action requires adoption of the traditional perspective
of a continental power. Rather than focusing on what a Russian military presence
on the Sudanese coast of the Red Sea enables Russia to do on the open ocean, it
is better to look at how access to Sudan and the northeast African coast enables
Russia to influence events on land.54
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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Russian-African relations have been regaining lost ground steadily since
the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, since 2014 the strengthening of political and economic relations with the African continent has become
particularly striking, simultaneous with the deterioration of Russo-Western
relations.55 In recent years, this intensification of Russo-African relations has
manifested itself, among other ways, in a series of official visits of heads of
state of sub-Saharan African countries to Russia since 2015; a sequence of
diplomatic visits by high-ranking political stakeholders, such as President
Vladimir V. Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov, and Security Council
secretary Nikolay P. Patrushev, to the African continent in 2018; and the convening of the first Africa-Russia summit, which was held in Russia in October
2019.56
Russian policy interests in Africa are broad. They include cultivating and
strengthening previously existing and newly formed partnerships, particularly in
light of the Kremlin’s intent to advance a multipolar international order and resist
Western political and economic pressure in the post-2014 era; striving to weaken
the influence of Russia’s adversaries; dealing with such political issues as arise in
accordance with “razumniy [reasonable] pragmatism”; and realizing economic
objectives, such as gaining access to markets and resources.57
In many African locations, these policy objectives have direct implications for
Russia’s defense and security sectors. Since Russian involvement on the African
continent in areas such as trade, development aid, and investment of capital is far
outmatched by that of other important stakeholders, such as the EU, the United
States, China, and Japan, Russia makes ample use of its more-competitive instruments: security-related products and services, military diplomacy, and arms
exports.58
With regard to Sudan, various reports elaborate on the involvement of Russian agents associated with private military companies (PMCs) in the country’s
mining sector and the training of government forces.59 According to reports
published by Ukraine’s intelligence service (known as the SSU), Russian PMC
contractors apparently also were involved in the 2018–19 Sudanese revolution
and used Sudan as a regional hub for operations in Libya and the Central African
Republic (CAF).60 The strong bilateral relations between the two countries also
influenced the content of the Russo-Sudanese basing agreement, whose arrangements go far beyond questions of logistics and supply. For example, under the
agreement’s terms the Russian military also may deploy temporary mobile posts
outside the territory of the Russian supply base to ensure defense of the Sudanese
military’s naval base. Furthermore, with regard to protection of Russia’s supply
point and Sudan’s infrastructure on the Red Sea, the two countries have agreed
to cooperate when faced with external threats.61
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/7
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Russia’s good relations with Sudan also reportedly have given Russian private
and state actors access to the northern regions of the CAF.62 Russia has supported
the CAF government in its struggle against various rebel factions by delivering arms, as well as by sending Russian military personnel to train government
troops under an agreement reached in 2018. Subsequently, reports appeared
about the arrival alongside PMC fighters of Russian soldiers fulfilling training,
security, and support duties in the CAF.63 In early 2019, Russia was the decisive
force in brokering the Khartoum peace agreement.64
Apart from Sudan and the CAF, in addition to intelligence and Spetsnaz (special forces) units, Russian PMCs also are reported to be active in war-torn Libya
in support of Field Marshal Khalifa B. Haftar of the Libyan National Army, which
controls the country’s eastern part.65 Apparently, Russian PMC contractors are
tasked with training Haftar’s forces, clearing mines, and protecting seaports in
eastern Libya.66 The news agency Reuters quoted Yevgeny Shabayev, head of a
chapter of a paramilitary Cossack organization, as saying that, with regard to Russian security contractors in Africa, “there could be 1,000 in CAR [CAF] and between 5,000 to 10,000 across Africa, including Sudan, South Sudan, and Libya.”67
There are indications that these Russian PMCs often are intertwined closely
with the Russian state, both on the policy level and in their preparation for and
execution of their respective tasks.68 For example, during the battle of Debaltseve—a high-intensity battle during the war in Ukraine—Russian PMC fighters
apparently made use of Russian military personnel carriers.69 During the war in
Syria, Russian PMC fighters who had been wounded in a U.S. air strike apparently were evacuated on Russian military airplanes to Russian military hospitals.70
Thus, Russian PMCs appear not only to be working on behalf of the Russian
state and alongside state representatives; they also appear, under certain conditions, to be given access to Russian military assets and to operate with some
degree of liaison with the Russian armed forces. Given this operational history
of Russian PMCs in Ukraine and Syria, Russian military capabilities deployed
to or from Port Sudan could benefit Russian PMC activities in northeast Africa,
whether directly or indirectly.
Moreover, to conduct their operations successfully, these PMCs depend on the
shipment of large quantities of fuel, ammunition, and provisions to the interior
regions of the African continent. According to media reports, private Russian
companies also supply Sudanese clients with matériel such as personal protective
equipment and medicine.71
In the cases of Sudan and the CAF, economic and security interests intermix;
Russian stakeholders provide support in security affairs in part to obtain special
access to economic opportunities such as exploration for natural resources (e.g.,
gold and diamonds).72 The control and exploitation of energy resources also
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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drive Russian policy interests in Sudan and South Sudan as Russia seeks to secure
oil-exploration rights in the latter and to establish a refinery in the former.73 All
(South) Sudanese oil runs through two major pipelines that reach the coast of the
Red Sea at Bashayer Terminal, Port Sudan.74
Russian direct and indirect involvement in armed conflicts, training of
government and opposition forces, and other security matters on the African
continent primarily involves the delivery of large amounts of weapons, and arms
exports long have been a key function in Russo-African relations.75 According to
data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia
has become the most important arms exporter to Africa. Figure 4 shows the arms
exports of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to Africa.
Over the last decade, Russian arms exports have grown considerably. Between
2015 and 2019, almost 50 percent of all arms exports to Africa by these five
countries, as measured in million trend indicator values (TIVs), were delivered
by Russia. Furthermore, as figure 5 demonstrates, within the last five years the
African market has become significantly more important as a destination for
Russian weapons.
Within this trend, northeast Africa has been one of the busiest regions for
Russian arms exports in recent years. Other than Egypt, the various countries
included in this region are proximate to Port Sudan. Since 2011, Russia and
Sudan on several occasions have agreed on the delivery of military hardware. At
the beginning of the last decade, Moscow supplied two dozen Mi-24 attack helicopters and fourteen Mi-8 transport helicopters.76 In August 2020, the Russian
FIGURE 4
ARMS EXPORTS OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
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FIGURE 5
SHARE OF RUSSIAN ARMS EXPORTS DELIVERED TO AFRICA
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2010–2014
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Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 3 January 2021, armstrade.sipri.org/.

Ministry of Defense confirmed that the two countries had signed further armsexport contracts at the international military-technical forum Army-2020.77 As
recently as October 2020, against the backdrop of strengthening Russo-Sudanese
military cooperation, Russia handed over a training ship to the Sudanese navy.78
In late 2019–early 2020, Eritrea purchased Russian military helicopters.79 In the
same period, Rosoboronexport finished delivering Pantsir-S1 air-defense systems to neighboring Ethiopia.80 In 2016, according to Valeriy Varlamov, head of
a Rosoboronexport delegation, the Russian side was willing to consider exporting
weapons to Somalia and South Sudan if “the situation improves and [subject to]
a corresponding decision of the highest state organs.”81
When all the pieces of the puzzle are put together, they provide strong indications that Port Sudan plays a central role in the Kremlin’s strategic calculus for
the region. Sudan and its neighboring countries seek to acquire the weapons
and military capabilities that Russia is willing to offer. The 2019–20 agreements
give both countries the legal framework to satisfy these demands. Official and
clandestine activities of Russian security forces and PMCs require the movement
of large quantities of goods, particularly weapons. In this regard, as part of the
sealed agreements, the Russian Federation already has secured the right to use
Sudan’s transportation system, including its ports and airports, to transport any
military goods, including weapons and ammunition, needed to operate the Russian military base and its warships and to ensure the safety of its personnel and
Russian contractors.82 As already detailed above, past experience has shown that
Russian PMCs are granted access to official Russian military assets if they are
acting in the Kremlin’s interest, and there is little reason to doubt that the case
of Russia’s military presence in Sudan will be any different. It is true that most of
the reports on Russian arms deliveries available from open sources refer to cargo
flights as the principal means of transportation.83 However, very rarely a report
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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does appear that provides details about Russian seaborne arms transportation, as
was the case in 2018 with a Russian-registered cargo ship, Lada, that supposedly
was carrying weapons and other ordnance to Nigeria but was stopped by authorities in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, following a security check.84
The way in which military presence and access to a regional transportation
hub’s civilian infrastructure and commercial port facilities can aid in delivering
arms also is demonstrated by the case of the Chinese in Djibouti. In 2018, EXX
Africa, a business-risk-intelligence company, published a special report on Chinese arms deliveries to conflict zones in East Africa, including those under UN
embargo. According to the report, arms proliferation is managed by using the
Djibouti hub and involves China’s local People’s Liberation Army support base
and the city’s commercial port facilities.85
In the case of Russia, the example of the harbor of Tartus comes to mind.
There, Russia maintained a military presence and unloaded military equipment
at the same location to support its regional allies years before it decided to intervene officially in the Syrian civil war.86 Just as with Tartus and Djibouti, Port
Sudan is an important regional commercial port. It too features very good access
to the regional railway infrastructure, which will grow further once the Ethiopia–
Sudan railway connection linking Addis Ababa to Port Sudan, on which both
countries have agreed, is built.87
Some experts also point toward geopolitical rivalry in North Africa and the
Middle East as one potential driver for establishing a Russian military presence in
Port Sudan.88 Russia’s base is only about sixty kilometers (km) from the Sudanese
island of Suakin, which Turkey leased in December 2017 for ninety-nine years.89
In nearly every historical armed conflict occurring in the area spanning from the
Caucasus through Syria to Libya, Turkey has been Russia’s regional rival. Turkey
also is a NATO member state. The country has been expanding its presence
massively in Muslim northeast Africa in recent years; in 2017, it set up its largest
overseas military base, Camp TURKSOM, in Somalia, as a training facility for
Somali government forces in their fight against al-Shabab.90 Russia’s base in Port
Sudan also is only a little more than 1,000 km from Djibouti, which is another
regional hub; the site of American, Chinese, and French military presences; and
a place where Turkey also seeks to expand its footprint. In 2020, Turkey and Djibouti agreed to foster maritime cooperation, set up a special economic zone, and
develop infrastructure.91 Various media sources have reported that Russia has
shown interest in establishing a military base in Djibouti in the past but failed to
secure an agreement.92
In 2018, Turkey and Sudan were in the process of making a series of deals that
would have included the Turkish military and police training Sudanese security
forces and establishment of a vessel-maintenance center in Port Sudan; however,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/7
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it is questionable whether Turkey can execute its plans in Sudan under the African country’s new leadership, since President Omar al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.93
The Kremlin’s moves to establish a military presence in the country, in the form
of the 2019 military-cooperation agreement and the subsequent 2020 lease of
Port Sudan, thus seem to fall in line with Russia’s policy interest of countering the
influence of regional rivals such as Turkey.
Taking into account the official and unofficial activities of the Russian military, the involvement of Russian PMCs in the security and economic affairs of
Sudan and neighboring countries, regional arms deliveries, and the access Port
Sudan provides to the regional infrastructure network, Port Sudan occupies an
ideal geostrategic location (see figure 6). It may become the Russian cornerstone
FIGURE 6
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in the region, supporting and implementing Russian policy interests as the
Kremlin seeks “to position itself in North Africa and beyond as an alternative
to the West.”94 Or, extending former president al-Bashir’s metaphor that “Sudan
may be Russia’s key to Africa,” it may be said that Russia’s military presence in
Port Sudan will be its door.95
As argued throughout this article, Russia’s naval presence in the western Indian
Ocean’s marginal seas is central to pursuing the country’s various national interests,
particularly building partnerships, gathering intelligence, and boosting militaryindustrial cooperation with littoral countries. Located on the western shore of this
great maritime theater, Sudan and its neighboring countries have become a principal area of operations for Russian governmental, private, and hybrid stakeholders.
Safeguarding their activities, strengthening cooperative regional governments,
gaining access to northeast Africa and its markets and resources, countering the
influence of peer and near-peer competitors—all these qualify as primary Russian policy interests in the region, and they drive Russia’s military presence on the
shores of the Red Sea. Reviving the naval presence of the former Soviet 8th Operational Squadron; establishing a credible sea-denial capability against the other,
vastly superior navies that operate in the region; and, most unattainably, achieving
sea control and becoming a “Great Sea Power” in the Indian Ocean, do not.
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